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TORTIOUS SPEECH
DAVID

A. ANDERSON*

When most of the communications torts were developing, it was thought
that tortious speech required no constitutional protection. If the speech
occurred in advertising, the tort rules of liability were doubly insulated from
constitutional attack, because it was also believed that commercial speech
required no constitutional protection. The courts and occasionally the legislatures developed nonconstitutional rules to adjust between the social,
economic, and personal interests protected by these torts and the conflicting
values of free speech. Except in defamation, these state law rules are still
the dominant means of accommodating these competing interests.
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' however, we have known that
the constitution protects some tortious speech. Since the 1970s we have
known also that the constitution protects some commercial speech. As a
consequence, all the communications torts are now vulnerable to constitutional scrutiny. The one tort that has been fully subjected to this scrutiny,
libel, has been transformed into a half-tort, half-constitutional hybrid that
is almost universally viewed as unsatisfactory. As Dean Bezanson observes,
"it falls substantially short of safeguarding press freedom and fails to
' '2
safeguard individual reputation as well.
Unfortunately, the libel model is the one most emulated when courts
subject other tortious speech to constitutional scrutiny. The usual result of
this scrutiny is to disfigure the tort in an attempt to make it amenable to
a method of analysis to which it is not suited. Very recently, the Supreme
Court has embraced an entirely different model, a variant of the balancing
model on which the post-Warren Court has come to rely in so many first
amendment contexts. This model, developed to evaluate governmental regulation of speech, also is poorly suited to the tort context.
My purpose in this article is to provide an inventory of the various
communications torts, the interests they serve, the speech interests they
affect, and the analytical models courts use to resolve the constitutional
issues these torts create. I examine in some detail the dominant analytical
method-the defamation model-and the alternative the Court seems to

* Thompson and Knight Centennial Professor, University of Texas. To comply with
the disclosure policies of this publication, the author advises that he was or is a consultant in
two cases cited in this article, Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1989), and Newton v. National BroadcastingCo., 677 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Nev. 1987).
The author wishes to thank Ellen Williams for research assistance.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 535, 556 (1983). Professor
Halpern says of the present constitutional law of libel, "to characterize it as byzantine is
charitable." Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty
Five, 68 N.C.L. REv. 273, 311 (1990).
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favor at the moment-the balancing model-and conclude that neither is a
general solution to t6rtious speech problems. My purpose is not to propose
a different solution, but to suggest that there must be many different
accommodations, reflecting the enormous variety of interests protected by
these torts and the equally diverse types of speech by which these torts are
committed.
I.

Tm ComMUNIcATIoNs TORTS

The communications torts include at least the following: defamation,
invasion of privacy, injurious falsehood, misrepresentation, interference with
business relations, infliction of emotional distress, alienation of affections,
malicious prosecution, unfair competition, speech causing physical harm,
and some forms of prima facie tort.
Many of these are in fact umbrella terms for several torts, protecting
different interests and governed by different rules. Defamation includes libel
and slander, which have very different histories and significantly different
rules. Invasion of privacy includes disclosure of private facts, intrusion,
false light, and commercial exploitation; each has different rules, and the
last branch protects primarily economic, rather than privacy, interests.
Injurious falsehood encompasses the ancient torts of slander of title and
trade libel, as well as the more modern concept of product disparagement.
Misrepresentation has three distinct branches-deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and innocent misrepresentation-each with a different history, scope,
and purpose. Interference with business relations includes interference with
contract, to which there are few defenses, and interference with prospective
advantage, to which there are many. Emotional distress may be inflicted
intentionally or negligently; the states increasingly are recognizing the latter
as a tort and groping for ways to define and limit it. Unfair competition
may include disclosure of trade secrets, misappropriation of trade values,
or boycotting. Speech causing physical harm may be a tort as conventional
as liability for an airplane crash caused by a faulty navigational chart, or
as novel as liability for broadcasting a program that induces viewers to
emulate a dangerous act portrayed on the screen. Harmful speech that does
not seem to fit any of these categories may be actionable as a "prima facie
tort," whose scope and limitations seem to be developed ad hoc to suit the
particular case.
This inventory shows that there are at least twenty distinct communications torts. Some of them overlap, and some could usefully be combined.
If all or most were merely different labels for similar actions, or different
ways of dealing with essentially similar conflicts, their very multiplicity
might be reason to welcome constitutionalization of the field. But in fact
the various communications torts (with a few exceptions) address different
conflicts, arise in very different social and economic contexts, protect very
different interests, and involve vastly different kinds of speech.
The prospect of developing constitutional rules to accommodate all
these differences is daunting on its face, and anyone undaunted by the
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prospect has to be daunted by the results of the effort so far. The attempt
to accommodate by constitutional rule a few of the variables in just one
tort-libel-has greatly complicated that area of law. The fragmentary
efforts of courts to reconcile speech interests with other communications
torts have produced crude distortions of those torts in the effort to force
them into the constitutional mold developed for defamation. Before these
efforts proceed further, courts should take stock of the methods of constitutional analysis that are being used, the varieties of tortious speech to
which these analyses may be applied, and the diversity of interests the
analyses must accommodate.

II.

CONSTITuTiNL ANALYSIS

The courts have followed at least four analytical models in their attempts
to reconcile the needs of tort law with constitutional imperatives: (1) an
"incitement" standard borrowed from the constitutional law of criminal
punishment of speech; (2) a categorical approach in which speech may or
may not be subject to tort liability, depending on the constitutional importance of the category -of speech; (3) the constitutional defamation model,
centered around but not limited to the "actual malice" standard; and (4)
a balancing method in which speech can be subject to liability if the tort
interest is strong enough and the remedy is "narrowly tailored."
All except the defamation model are so embryonic that to call them
models is to overstate their coherence; they might more accurately be thought
of as overtures. The defamation model has been elaborately developed in
libel and slander, and often extended to other torts. Although the balancing
model has been applied to a tort problem only recently, it enjoys great
favor with the Supreme Court in other contexts and must be considered the
major alternative to the defamation model.

A.

The Incitement Model

The Supreme Court has always viewed some types of speech as unworthy
of first amendment protection. At one time libel (and probably all other
tortious speech) was among these, 3 but no longer. One type of speech that
remains beyond the protection of the first amendment is incitement to
imminent lawless activity. The Court has implied that speech can be criminally punished if "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and ... likely to incite or produce such action. ' 4 In cases where speech
causes physical injury, courts generally have employed some variant of this
formula to decide whether liability may be imposed consistently with the

3. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952).
4. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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first amendment. The theory is that liability may be imposed only if the
publication goes beyond mere advocacy
and amounts to incitement directed
5
to imminent action causing injury.
In truth, the incitement formula is not so much a standard of liability
as an explanation for the courts' unwillingness to apply ordinary negligence
rules to certain kinds of speech. The usual line of reasoning in tort cases
that employ the incitement model is something like this: the first amendment
protects the speech unless it falls within a recognized exception such as
defamation, fighting words, obscenity, or incitement; since incitement is the
only exception possibly relevant, it is the plaintiff's only hope; but the
negligent speech is only advocacy (or mere description); therefore, the
exception does not apply, and the first amendment bars liability. 6 Because
usually it is clear that the speech is not incitement, the cases provide little
guidance as to how the standard might be met. One court suggested that
the plaintiff would have to prove the act causing injury was a "lawless"
act, 7 but that seems too demanding. Showing that the act was foreseeably
dangerous should be enough; if the incitement test, which was developed
to deal with criminal speech, is to be applied to tortious speech, it should
at least be adapted to the new setting.
One case in which liability perhaps could have been imposed on an
incitement theory is Weirum v. RKO General,Inc.8 Defendant's radio station
conducted a contest exhorting its teenage audience to be first to catch up
with a disc jockey driving from one location to another in the Los Angeles
area. Plaintiffs' decedent was a motorist killed in an accident caused by a
teenager speeding to win the contest. The California Supreme Court affirmed
a judgment for plaintiffs, disposing of the first amendment defense with
the inaccurate assertion that "The First Amendment does not sanction the
infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than
act." 9 The court, however, could have sustained liability on an incitement
theory. If the incitement standard can ever permit liability for tortious
speech causing physical injury, it should be satisfied by defendant's exhorting
a teenage audience to engage in reckless driving that the station knew would
be dangerous to others.
A variant of the incitement model requires proof that the speech "posed
a clear and present danger of injury." 10 This standard essentially replaces
the foreseeability requirement of the ordinary negligence action with a clear

5. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979);
DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982); Olivia N. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981).
7. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1022.
8. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975).
9. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472, 539 P.2d
36, 40 (1975).
10. See Shannon v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).

1990]

TORTIOUS SPEECH

and present danger test. The effect is to retain the incitement standard's
focus on imminence without its emphasis on the strength of the defendant's
efforts to induce action.
Of course, many cases of tortious speech causing physical injury are
resolved by conventional negligence principles or even strict liability. A
physician who gives an inaccurate diagnosis, or a manufacturer who inaccurately instructs a consumer on the safety of a product is likely to be held
liable for resulting injury with little thought given to the fact that an element
of the tort is speech." There are also some cases still thought to be an
appropriate means of analysis in which the speech interest is recognized by
2
negligence principles.
As a bar to liability for physical injury caused by speech, the incitement
standard works well. It is less useful as a standard for determining when
liability should be imposed. Whether the speaker should have to pay for
such an injury has little to do with the degree of persuasion employed.
More likely to be relevant are the value of the speech, the relationship
between the speaker and the victim, the effect on the industry or other class
of speakers of imposing liability for the particular kind of speech, and the
ability of the class of speakers to socialize the costs of liability.
B.

The CategoricalModel

The incitement model is essentially a categorical scheme: speech receives
no protection if it is classified as incitement, and is absolutely protected if
it is not. There are other classification schemes that use the same methodology but lack the established constitutional doctrinal base of the incitement
model. The most familiar example is "fraud"; without much constitutional
analysis or explanation, courts simply assume that fraudulent speech is not
protected by the first amendment. 3
Another category of this sort has been created in the constitutional law
of defamation. If the defamation occurs in speech about matters of public
concern, the extent of constitutional protection is determined by the rules
discussed later in this article. But if it occurs in speech about "matters of
purely private concern," the constitution apparently affords no protection
4
at all.'

11. See, e.g., Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); Skillings

v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919). For an excellent study of tort liability for
speech causing physical or economic harm, see Note, Publisher Liability for Material That
Invites Reliance, 66 TEx. L. Ray. 1155 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.
1989).

13. See, e.g., Perlman v. Time Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 190, 380 N.E.2d 1040 (1978).
14. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-61 (1985).
The Supreme Court decided only what was necessary to resolve the case before it: that the
Constitution does not restrict punitive and presumed damages in these "purely private" libel
cases. The Court could still hold that the Constitution bars strict liability or requires plaintiffs
to prove falsity in these cases.
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At the other extreme is political speech, which may be held to be
absolutely protected even though the speech would otherwise be tortious.
This analysis is seen in cases in which the defendant interferes with the
plaintiff's economic relations for political purposes. In NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.,'-' the NAACP organized a boycott of white merchants, and
used tactics of intimidation and social ostracism to dissuade blacks from
trading with the merchants. The state court held these tactics actionable as
malicious interference with business. The Supreme Court reversed.
[T]he petitioners certainly foresaw-and directly intended-that the
merchants would sustain economic injury as a result of their campaign .... [H]owever, the purpose of petitioners' campaign was
not to destroy legitimate competition. Petitioners sought to vindicate
rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. The right of the States to regulate
economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against
a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed
6
by the Constitution itself.'
The state could impose liability for the losses caused by the violent aspects
of the boycott to the extent those losses could be separated from the
nonviolent aspects, but not for the losses caused by speech, assembly, and
petition, even though the Court acknowledged that the purpose of those
7
protected activities was to pressure blacks into observing the boycott.
In other contexts, the courts are sometimes less deferential to the
interferor's political purpose. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a local hospital staff's letter-writing campaign that
allegedly interfered with the contracts of an abortion clinic could be actionable even if the campaign's purpose was political. "If, as the [clinic] alleges,
the doctors' activities went beyond mere persuasion and included threats,
we do not think that the purity of their motivations would shield them
from liability.' 1 8 Nevertheless, the method is still categorical; the interference
is absolutely protected if the speech is political, but threats are not political
speech even if politically motivated.
Another category to which the Supreme Court at one point seemed to
extend absolute protection was truthful information obtained from public
judicial records. The Court held that liability for an invasion of privacy
resulting from publication of such information about a rape-murder was
unconstitutional. 9 As we shall see in the section on the balancing model,

15. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
16. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 914 (1982).
17. Id. at 909-10.
18. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 551-52 (5th
Cir. 1978).
19. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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the Court seemed to back away from this approach when next confronted
with a similar issue.20
Like the incitement model, these classification schemes work better as
devices for exclusion than as analytical tools. There are certain kinds of
speech (e.g., perjury) that undeniably deserve no constitutional protection
from criminal sanctions, and some kinds (e.g., fraudulent speech) probably
deserve no protection from tort liability. Refusal to engage in any constitutional analysis of these types of speech is perfectly appropriate. It does
not follow, however, that the categories of speech subject to constitutional
protection by the classification decision deserve absolute protection. For
example, political speech is not absolutely protected from the law of
defamation, or even from prior restraint. 21 There is no obvious reason why
it should be absolutely protected in interference with business relations.
Anti-abortion protestors should not have an absolute right to put an abortion
clinic out of business, even if their motives are purely political. The result
in ClaiborneHardwareis hard to accept on racially neutral grounds; if the
defendant was the Ku Klux Klan, and had used speech to coerce whites to
support a politically motivated boycott of black merchants, it seems unlikely
that the Court would say the Klan's political motives should be an absolute
shield against tort liability.
The classification-of-speech model may be useful at one extreme to bar
any constitutional analysis of speech that requires no protection. But it is
too crude a method for resolving the majority of speech-tort conflicts.

C.

The Defamation Model

The rule that public officials cannot recover unless they can show
"actual malice" is often perceived as the primary constitutional limit on
libel law, but in fact that rule has become merely the keystone in a massive
wall designed to protect defamatory speech. Whether the evidence is sufficient to identify the plaintiff as the target of the defamation, and whether
the statement can be reasonably understood to be defamatory, are also
issues of constitutional dimension, at least in some contexts. 22 The constitution also imposes procedural restraints; actual malice must be shown with
convincing clarity23 (a burden a plaintiff in a federal court must meet merely
to survive summary judgment), 24 and a finding of actual malice must be
independently reviewed by all appellate courts.25 Proof of malice in any of
the usual senses does not meet the "actual malice" requirement; there must

20. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
22. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc., 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1965).
23. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
24. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
25. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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be proof that the defendant actually had serious doubt as to the truth of
26
the defamatory statement.
The actual malice test must be met not only by public officials, but by
any "public figure" as well-a category that includes people who have done
nothing to invite media attention except excel in their vocations or avocations.27 The public figure category includes not only national celebrities, but
2
also those who are prominent in one controversy, industry, or community.
It may even include some who are involuntarily drawn into public view by
events beyond their control. 29
Even those who are neither public officials nor public figures must meet
the actual malice requirement if they hope to recover presumed or punitive
damages for defamatory statements made in connection with matters of
public concern.30 Since few plaintiffs can prove enough actual, pecuniary
loss to make litigation against media defendants feasible, actual malice has
become a crucial issue in virtually all media libel cases. Private plaintiffs
who are willing to forego presumed and punitive damages need not show
actual malice, but still must show at least negligence on the part of the
3
defendant .
These restraints are the most familiar of the constitutional limitations
on defamation, but they are supplemented by many other constitutional
barriers. Truth is no longer a defensive matter; the plaintiff must prove
32
falsity, at least in all cases except those involving purely private defamation.
Statements of opinion are absolutely protected, and many statements clearly
implying defamatory assertions of fact are treated as opinion under this
rule. 33 Some courts hold that the first amendment protects a "neutral report"

26. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (football coach); Chuy
v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (professional
football player); Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 677 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Nev. 1987)
(entertainer); James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834 (1976) (belly dancer).
28. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Williams v. Pasma, 656 P.2d 212 (Mont. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
29. See, e.g., Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 765 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
31. Id.
32. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
33. See, e.g., Southern Air Transport v. American Broadcasting Co., 877 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Baker
v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 721 P.2d 87 (1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987). The Supreme Court has not held that opinion is absolutely
protected. The Court's dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974), that
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea" is the source of the
proposition. Recently, however, the Court has granted certiorari in a case interpreting this
language as barring liability. Milkovich v. Loran Journal Co., No. 89-645, cert. granted, Jan.
22, 1990.

1990]

TORTIOUS SPEECH

by a third party even if the publisher knows the
of defamatory statements
34
false.
is
allegation
The constitutional defamation rules are designed to achieve a tolerable
accommodation between two well established and universally shared valuesprotecting reputation and encouraging robust debate on public issues. The
rules are criticized for inadequately serving both of those values. They
require enormous sacrifice by victims of defamatory falsehoods-by private
persons who cannot show enough pecuniary loss to make litigating worthwhile, by public figures and public officials who cannot prove actual malice,
and even by victims who can prove actual malice but run afoul of other
constitutional rules that absolutely bar recovery. They exact a social cost
by diminishing the effectiveness of defamation law as a deterrent of calumny
in public discourse.
On the other hand, the constitutional defamation rules are an expensive
form of protection for the press and other speakers. They appear to have
increased rather than diminished the cost of defending libel suits. 35 Their
emphasis on fault tends to shift the focus of litigation from the question
of harm to the plaintiff's reputation to questions about the defendant's
journalistic policies and practices. Consequently, in those instances where
the jury is satisfied that the defendant's conduct is sufficiently egregious to
meet the constitutional standards, damage awards are often very large. In
addition, the need to discover the defendant's subjective state of mind as
to the possible falsity of the statement often invites protracted and intrusive
36
discovery into editorial matters.
If the constitutional defamation model produces unsatisfactory results
in libel, where the competing values are clearly defined and generally shared,
it does not seem to be a promising method of resolving tort-speech conflicts
in other areas where the competing values are very different and often less
universally embraced. Nevertheless, the defamation model has been extended
to many other tort cases, even when it fits poorly. The Supreme Court has
employed the model in emotional distress and false light privacy cases, and
the lower courts have applied it in several other torts.
1. The Defamation Model Applied to Emotional Distress
Hustler Magazine published an ad parody depicting the Reverend Jerry
Falwell saying that his first sexual experience was an incestuous encounter
with his drunken mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued for libel, invasion

34. See, e.g., Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Burns v. Times Argus, 430 A.2d 773 (Vt. 1981).
35. See Report of the Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program 9

(1989).
36. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). For an extended critique of the
current constitutional law of libel, see Halpern, supra note 2. Professor Halpern would abolish
most of the existing constitutional rules and require all plaintiffs to prove falsity, negligence,
and actual damages.
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of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He lost in the
trial court on the libel and invasion of privacy claims, but won a $150,000
judgment on the emotional distress claim.
The law of Virginia permitted recovery for this tort on a showing that
the defendant intentionally or recklessly, by conduct offensive to generally
accepted standards of decency or morality, caused the plaintiff severe
emotional distress.3 7 In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit the magazine argued that the constitutional rules of defamation
should control, requiring Falwell (a public figure) to prove that the magazine
published the parody with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth. The court agreed that the magazine was entitled to the same level of
constitutional protection that it would receive in a libel action, but that the
protection need not be provided in precisely the same form.
...
Virginia law requires that the defendant's conduct be intentional
or reckless. That is precisely the level of fault that New York Times
requires in an action for defamation. The first amendment will not
shield intentional or reckless misconduct resulting in damage to
reputation, and neither will it shield such misconduct which results
in severe emotional distress. We, therefore, hold that when the first
amendment requires application of the actual malice standard, the
standard is met when the jury finds that the defendant's intentional
or reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury complained
38
of.

The Supreme Court rejected this attempt to adapt the defamation rules
to a tort where the injury and the nature of the wrong are different.3 9 The
Court held that the tort law requirements of intent and outrageousness were
not sufficient substitutes for the constitutional requirement of actual malice.
Accepting Hustler's invitation to analogize the ad parody to editorial cartoons, the Court stated that speech "in the area of public debate about
public figures" deserves first amendment protection even when uttered with
intent to inflict severe emotional distress. 40 The additional requirement of
outrageousness was considered too subjective to provide a principled basis
for defining the limits of constitutional protection.
Without further discussion of the differences between defamation and
infliction of emotional distress, and without consideration of any other
method of accommodating speech interests, the Court held that the case
was controlled by the actual malice requirement of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan:
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason

37.
38.
39.
40.

Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1275.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Id. at 52-53.

TORTIOUS SPEECH
of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that
the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or
4
not it was true. '
The actual malice requirement itself, however, provided Hustler with
no protection; the magazine could not and did not claim to believe what it
had said about Falwell was true. Thus it was necessary to add a gloss to
the New York Times rule: since it would be nonsensical to apply a knowingor-reckless falsity test to parody, which by definition is "false," the plaintiff
also must show that the defendant made a "reasonably believable" false
statement of fact. 42 Since the jury had found in connection with Falwell's
libel claim that the parody could not be reasonably understood as describing
actual facts or events, there was no such statement. Falwell's claim for
emotional distress, therefore, was constitutionally barred because it failed
as a claim for defamation.
The apparent result of Falwell is to immunize all parody about public
figures from all sources of tort liability; whatever the theory of recovery,
the plaintiff can recover only by showing that the offending statement could
reasonably be understood as describing actual facts or events-in other
words, that it was not parody. Falwell is an effective if slightly disingenuous
solution to the immediate problem. The case foreclosed the possibility that
plaintiffs might circumvent the constitutional rules of defamation by suing
for emotional distress instead. It avoided the difficulty of trying to distinguish between editorial cartoons and political satire, on the one hand, and
crude vulgarities like the Hustler parody on the other.
As Professor LeBel has shown, however, Falwell is not a satisfactory
prescription for accommodating first amendment interests with infliction of
emotional distress generally. 43 To bring this tort within the framework of
41. Id. at 56.
42. Id. at 57. In an important article that appeared as this volume went to press,
Professor Post offers a justification for the result in Falwell that is far more sophisticated
than the Court's. In his view, Hustler's parody is protected not because it fails to make a
believable but false statement of fact, but because it makes a claim "about an independent
world the validity of which depends upon the standards or conventions of a particular
community, and about which we therefore cannot expect convergence under conditions of
cultural heterogeneity." Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HLv.L. REv. 601,
660 (1990). In his view the first amendment exists to protect cultural heterogeneity in public
discourse, and therefore must be construed to prevent the- community from imposing its
standards of civility on Hustler.
43. LeBel, Emotional Distress, the First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech": a
Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. CoLo. L. REv. 315 (1989).
Professor LeBel proposes a constitutional rule requiring plaintiff to prove intent or recklessness,
distress so severe it is disabling, extreme and outrageous conduct, and that the speech is aimed
directly at the plaintiff (rather than at a wider audience) or that the speech is without serious
social value. Id. at 351. Whether or not Professor LeBel's proposal is the best solution to the
problem, it shows at least that approaches are available that fit the tort better than the
defamation model.
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constitutional limitations established for defamation, the Court had to inject
into the emotional distress action an issue of falsity, which is not logically
an element of this tort. False speech is no more likely to inflict emotional
distress than truthful speech. Defamation draws a distinction between truthful and false speech not because the latter is less likely to cause harm, but
because truthful speech is socially more valuable. 44 But in Falwell the Court
draws this distinction not because the value of the speech turns on its truth
or falsity, but merely to make it possible to apply the actual malice test.
The logic of Falwell is that the tort law requirements of intent and
outrageousness do not sufficiently protect speech interests; the actual malice
test, therefore, must be applied, and since falsity is the focus of that test,
falsity must be made an element of the emotional distress tort so that actual
malice can be applied.
The inappropriateness of making falsity the key to constitutional protection in the emotional distress torts is evident in the following hypothetical.
Suppose a newspaper knows that P, a candidate for public office, had an
abortion as an unmarried teenager. The newspaper, supporting P's opponent
and hoping to induce P to withdraw from the contest, publishes references
to "skeletons in P's closet" and P's "dirty little secret." The newspaper
has no intention of publishing the information about the abortion, but
intends to cause P such distress that she will withdraw her candidacy.
P is a public figure, so Falwell presumably applies; if it does, there can
be no recovery because there is no false statement of fact. Yet the first
amendment interest served by protecting this speech is minimal; the newspaper says only enough to serve its own purposes, not enough to inform
the electorate. The courts might decline to apply Falwell to such a case on
the ground that this is not speech "in the area of debate about public
figures. ' 4 But that would only confirm the point that Falwell is an ad hoc
solution to a peculiar problem, not an appropriate means of accommodating
first amendment interests in emotional distress cases generally.
2.

The Defamation Model Applied to False Light Privacy

The Supreme Court has had occasion to accommodate speech interests
with tort interests in two kinds of privacy cases. The first are what have
become known as "false light" cases. The Court has decided two of these
cases, Time, Inc. v. Hill" and Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.4 7 In
both, the plaintiff's complaint was that his or her experiences were exploited
by the media. Hill's family had been held hostage by escaped convicts, and
his complaint was with a Life magazine article about the opening of a play

44. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
45. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 53. Since the scurrility in Falwell was treated
as speech "in the area of debate about public figures," however, one cannot be sanguine
about this possibility.
46. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
47. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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that purported to be based on the Hills' experiences. Mrs. Cantrell's husband
had been killed along with many others in a bridge collapse. Her complaint
was that a newspaper's Sunday magazine feature six months later used her
impoverished family to illustrate the impact of the event on the lives of
survivors.
In these cases the distortion of the tort action has been a two-step
process. The plaintiffs' real complaint is that the media exploited their
experiences. This publicity is not actionable under the commercial exploitation branch of privacy because the exploitation occurs in news (or at least
journalism).48 It is not actionable under "true" privacy because it involves
matters of legitimate public interest. Nevertheless, courts have been sympathetic to these claims. To avoid constitutional problems, courts seized
upon a distinction between accurate and "fictionalized" exploitation of
experiences. 49 If the analysis were worked out in conventional tort terms,
the tort would be viewed as exploitation of the plaintiff's private life, and
the public's legitimate interest in the matter would be treated as a conditional
privilege, defeasible by a showing that the account is fictionalized.
The matter was not developed in tort terms, however. Instead, the New
York Court of Appeals read a fictionalization requirement into that state's
privacy statute to save it from unconstitutionality, and falsity became an
essential element of the tort.
This occurred about the same time the Supreme Court was adopting
the knowing-or-reckless-falsity rubric to accommodate speech interests in
defamation, and it allowed the Court to apply the same accommodation to
false light. Thus, the false light tort, already distorted by the New York
courts' treatment of falsity as an essential element of the wrong, was further
distorted by the Court's decision to require proof not only that the account
was false, but also that the defendant published with knowledge or reckless
51
disregard of its falsity.
The artificiality of the accommodation is apparent in Cantrell. The
privacy invasion was the article's depiction of the family's poverty, the
children's old and ill-fitting clothes, and the deteriorating condition of their
home. These conditions were confirmed by the photographs accompanying
the article, however, and while the Court suggests "significant misrepresentations were contained in the details, ' 5 2 it does not say what these were or
question the central theme that the Cantrells were living in abject poverty.
The knowing falsehood principally relied upon by the Court in upholding
a $60,000 judgment was an implication that Mrs. Cantrell had been present
when the author visited her home and that he had personally observed her

48.
Stephano
49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press, 614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985);
v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1984).
See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966).
Id. at 329-30, 221 N.E.2d at 545-46.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974).
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that had very little to do with Mrs. Cantrell's

3. The Defamation Model Applied to Interference with Patronage
Blatty v. New York Times is another attempt to apply constitutional
defamation rules to a very different communications tort, in this instance
by a state court.5 4 Blatty was the author of a novel which he alleged the
New York Times excluded from the Times' best-seller list even after his
publisher furnished the newspaper with figures showing the book had sold
more copies than other books on the list. Blatty sued on several theories,
including intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. In
conformity with the general common-law elements of that tort, Blatty alleged
that the New York Times had intentionally interfered with his prospective
sales to booksellers and the general public by excluding his book from the
list while representing that the list was an objective and accurate compilation
of sales when the newspaper knew that it was not.
The California Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the claim on the
ground that the first amendment barred the action. The court began by
asserting that "Although the limitations that define the First Amendment's
zone of protection for the press were established in defamation actions,
they are not peculiar to such actions but apply to all claims whose gravamen
,,5" The court then
is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement ....
asserted that one of those constitutional defamation rules is that the actionable statement must be "of or concerning" the plaintiff. This refers of
course to the venerable colloquium requirement of the common law of
defamation. If the defamatory statement does not identify the plaintiff on
its face, the plaintiff must show the extrinsic facts that enable the recipient
to infer that the statement refers to the plaintiff. Only one small corner of
the colloquium rule has been constitutionalized, however. Where the statement on its face is impersonal criticism of government, and the plaintiff's
colloquium is merely that he or she is the official responsible for the
criticized governmental agency or activity, "such a proposition may not
constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack
on governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible for those
operations." 56 The reason is that such a theory would be too close to
seditious libel-a reason that has no relevance whatever to Blatty's claim.

53. Id. at 253.
54. 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542, 728 P.2d 1177 (1986).
55. Blatty v. New York Times, 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1042, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542, 728 P.2d
1177, 1182 (1986). The court erroneously cited Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466
U.S. 485 (1984), for the proposition that "in a product-disparagement action a public figure
plaintiff must prove actual malice." The trial court so held in that case, but the issue was not
before the Supreme Court and the Court chose to "express no view on that ruling." Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
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The California Supreme Court read this constitutional rule much more
broadly, as a general limitation on any cause of action alleging an injurious
falsehood, "granting it to those who are the direct object of criticism and
denying it to those who merely complain of nonspecific statements that they
believe cause them some hurt.""7 The court also thought this limitation
desirable as a matter of policy; in its absence, statements about a religious,
ethnic, or political group might invite many lawsuits by disgruntled members,
deterring the media from informing the public about such groups. 8
Applying this reasoning to Blatty's claim for intentional interference
with prospective advantage, the court held that he could not meet the
constitutional burden of showing that the Times' publication was "of or
concerning" him. The best-seller list did not explicitly refer to Blatty or his
novel. It could not reasonably be understood to refer to Blatty or his novel
by implication, because the implication-that his book did not sell as many
copies as the books listed-would be equally applicable to all others whose
books were excluded, a group that is too large to confer a cause of action
on each member.5 9 The court said it was proper to deny him leave to amend
because there was no reasonable possibility he could cure the defect. As
Professor Langevardt has observed, "the plaintiff lost the case for the
precise reason that prompted him to bring the suit: that his novel was not
' 6
mentioned in the list."
Here as in Falwell, the court forces a three-legged constitutional garment
to fit a two-legged tort by engrafting onto the tort an extraneous appendage.
In Falwell the extraneous issue was falsity; here it is identification of the
plaintiff. The latter is an issue in defamation because of the rule that harm
may be presumed. If defamation plaintiffs were required to prove the harm
caused by the statement, there would be no identification issue; it would
be subsumed in the proof-of-harm issue. Because the theory of defamation
is that harm may be presumed from the publication itself, 6' the plaintiff
must necessarily prove that he or she is identifiable; if he or she is not,
there is no basis for presuming he or she is harmed.
In interference with patronage (and in all other communications torts
except defamation and perhaps privacy) there is no presumption of harm.
Plaintiff recovers only for such injury as he or she is able to prove.6 2 The
issue is whether the offending statement caused plaintiff's harm-not whether
it was "of and concerning" plaintiff.

57. Blatty, 42 Cal. 3d at 1044, 728 P.2d at 1183.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1046.
60. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious Falsehood,
62 TEMPLE L. Q. 903, 956 (1989).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 569.
62. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 549 (fraudulent misrepresentation),
552B (negligent misrepresentation), 633 (injurious falsehood), 774A (interference with business
relations).
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This point is not merely theoretical. There is no sound reason why an
action for interference with prospective advantage should be denied merely
because the offending speech or conduct is not directed specifically at the
plaintiff.63 Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff is a distributor of
imported beer, and the defendant, a distributor of domestic beer, interferes
with the plaintiff's sales by spreading rumors that imported beer contains
urine. If the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intended to divert sales
from imported to domestic beer, it is immaterial that the rumors were not
directed at the plaintiff.
In Blatty the allegation was that the Times intentionally interfered with
sales of Blatty's book by impliedly representing that his book was less
popular than it was. If, as alleged, the Times knew its list was inaccurate,
and knew that the effect would be to hurt sales of Blatty's book, it should
be immaterial that the newspaper was able to accomplish its purpose without
identifying Blatty.
The number of potential plaintiffs and the size of their aggregate claims
may be a source of concern in these cases, but that concern bears little
relation to whether the interfering statement is "of and concerning" the
plaintiff. That concern should be addressed (as it is in negligent misrepresentation, for example)" by rules limiting the scope of liability to something
less than the entire field of foreseeable plaintiffs. In the Blatty case, the
scope of liability is self-limiting. The best-seller list contained names of 15
books; even if the Times was wrong with respect to every book listed, the
potential class of plaintiffs is limited to the 15 authors who could show
that their books should have been on the list.
4.

The Defamation Model Applied to Injurious Falsehood

Disparagement, trade libel, and slander of title are distant cousins of
defamation. At common law these torts were established by proof that the
defendant caused specific pecuniary loss by maliciously communicating to
a third party a false statement disparaging the plaintiff's product, service,
or title. Malice could mean intent to do harm or want of a good faith
belief in the truth of the statement.
The second Restatement of Torts suggested that the actual malice
standard from defamation might replace the common-law definition of
malice. Thus, liability would exist under Section 623A of the Restatement
if the defendant should recognize that the statement is likely to cause

63. Of course, there must be intent to interfere, but that can be established by showing
that the defendant knew to a substantial certainty that his conduct would interfere. In the
other intentional torts, it is immaterial whether the defendant's intent was directed at the
plaintiff or at someone else; intent to cause harm to a third person is treated as intent to
harm the plaintiff. See, e.g., RESTATBMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 18. There is no reason for
a different rule here.
64. See, e.g., First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir.
1989).
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pecuniary harm to the plaintiff and makes the statement with knowing or
reckless disregard of its falsity. The courts generally have adopted this
suggestion, making the actual malice standard an element of the injurious
6
falsehood torts. 1
Occasionally, however, the courts have carried the defamation analogy
further, importing into injurious falsehood an inappropriate distinction
between public and private plaintiffs. The result is an assumption that the
6
actual malice standard is applicable only if the plaintiff is a public figure.
The public-private distinction is employed in defamation because the Supreme Court believes reputations of private persons deserve more protection,
on the theory that they (1) have not waived that protection by participating
in public matters and (2) lack the self-help opportunities of public plaintiffs,
who are thought to enjoy better access to media. 67 But in injurious falsehood,
the issue is not the plaintiff's reputation, but instead the "reputation" of
the product, service, or title-the deserts of which have little to do with
the public or private status of the purveyor. The product, service, or title
is subject to public attention because it is offered in the marketplace, not
because of the identity of the offeror. Trying to define "private plaintiff"
in this context is nonsensical, because placing the product or service in the
market makes the matter "public" in the only relevant sense.
There may be occasions when an injurious falsehood should not receive
the protection of the actual malice standard-for example, when the plaintiff
has not placed anything in the market-but the public-plaintiff distinction
does not help to identify them.
The defamation model works more or less well depending on the tort
setting in which it is employed. Whether the actual malice test accomplishes
its purposes in libel and slander can be debated, but at least the model fits.
The model also fits reasonably well in the injurious falsehood torts, if it is
applied by analogy rather than literally. The defamation model can be made
to fit false light privacy cases, but only by distorting the tort to change its
focus from privacy to falsehood. It can be made to fit infliction of emotional
distress only through similar distortion. It does not fit interference with
business relations at all.
D.

The Balancing Model

In several areas of first amendment law, the Supreme Court resolves
cases by a balancing process that is, if not ad hoc, at least highly situational.
Before media can be subjected to differential taxation, "the State must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and

65. See Pecora v. Szabo, 94 IlL.
App. 3d 57, 418 N.E.2d 431 (1981) (stating that
overwhelming authority holds that malice requires knowledge of falsity of disparaging statements or reckless disregard of falsity).
66. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
67. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:71

is narrowly drawn." 69 A newspaper reporter has a first amendment right to
attend a trial unless the state can show that it has a substantial interest in
exclusion, that the exclusion is the least restrictive means of protecting that
interest, and that the exclusion is likely to be effective.6 9
1. Commercial Speech Doctrine
Variations of this process are used in other areas of first amendment
analysis, including commercial speech. In that area, the Court has expanded
the balancing process into a four-part analysis:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest. 70
Last year the Supreme Court modified the fourth prong of that test. All
that is required now is a "reasonable fit" between the objective and the
'71
means chosen to achieve it, "not necessarily the least restrictive means.
Litigants sometimes look to commercial speech doctrine for a solution
to speech-tort conflicts, but usually it does not provide one. In the first
place, many tortious speech cases do not involve commercial speech. The
Supreme Court has sometimes defined commercial speech narrowly, as
"speech proposing a commercial transaction," and sometimes more broadly,
as "expression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its
audience." ' 72 But much tortious speech falls outside either of those definitions. Libel and invasion of privacy are only the most obvious instances
where the offending speech has nothing to do with either commercial
transactions or economic interests. The offending speech may be noncommercial in almost any of the other communications torts as well. Protestors
who seek to turn potential patients away from an abortion clinic are not
engaged in commercial speech. Animal rights activists who disparage a
furrier's products are attempting to influence commercial transactions, but
also to influence public opinion. The misrepresenter usually does so to
obtain something of value from the victim, but not always.7 3 Speech inflicting
68. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
69. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
70. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566

(1980).
71. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3035 (1989).
72. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436
U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Burr v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Stark County, 23 Ohio St. 3d 69, 491
N.E.2d 1101 (1986) (misrepresentation by adoption agency of baby's health).
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emotional distress, either intentionally or negligently, usually is not "commercial."
Even when the tortious speech is "commercial," that body of doctrine
may not provide an appropriate framework for decision. Commercial speech
doctrine begins by asking whether the transaction proposed by the speech
is lawful. That inquiry is little help; even in torts where the speech deserves
no protection, the speech may propose perfectly legal activity. The deceiver
who says "Buy my stock and I will make you rich" may be proposing a
perfectly legal transaction, as may the newspaper that says "If you want
to read the books everyone else is reading, buy these best-sellers."
The next inquiry in commercial speech analysis is whether the speech
is false or misleading. This question may or may not be helpful in analyzing
a communications tort. In the injurious falsehood torts, some false speech
is protected, and should be, to create "breathing space" for vigorous
discussion in the marketplace, even by competitors. 74 On the other hand,
some tortious speech deserves no protection even if truthful. Whether Texaco
should be liable for interfering with Penzoil's contract to buy Getty Oil has
little to do with the fact that Texaco was telling the truth when it said "We
75
will pay a higher price."
These two inquiries, which together comprise the first branch of commercial speech doctrine, would protect some tortious speech that does not
deserve protection and exclude some that does. The remaining branches of
the doctrine are not peculiar to commercial speech, but are merely an
application of the general balancing model, to which we now turn.
2. The Balancing Model Applied to Privacy
Last term the Supreme Court employed the balancing model in a tort
case for the first time in Florida Star v. B.J.F.76 The tort was a newspaper's
disclosure of true but embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff-that
she had been a rape victim. The Court said liability for disclosure of truthful
information lawfully obtained is constitutional, "if at all, only when nar77
rowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order."
The victim's name was treated as having been lawfully obtained, even
though the police in disclosing it to the newspaper and the newspaper in
printing it both apparently violated a criminal statute forbidding disclosure
of a rape victim's identity. The publication was also in violation of the
7
newspaper's own policy against such disclosures.
74. See, e.g., Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir.
1987).
75. Cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987).
76. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
77. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (1989). Florida Star was decided four
weeks before Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028

(1989), which held that "narrowly tailored" does not mean "least restrictive" in commercial
speech analysis. Fox does not mention FloridaStar and it is not yet clear whether Fox modifies
the balancing formula in applications other than commercial speech.
78. Id. at 2605-06.
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The state interest in the case before the Court was that of compensating
a rape victim for a newspaper's disclosure of her full name, with details
identifying her neighborhood, while the assailant was still at large. The
victim testified that the publication resulted in threatening calls from a man
who said he would rape her again, and that she was forced to move, change
her phone number, seek police protection, and obtain mental health counseling. 79

The Court conceded that protecting the privacy and safety of rape
victims and encouraging them to report the crime without fear of exposure
were highly significant interests. "We accordingly do not rule out the
possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions for publication
of the name of a rape victim might be so overwhelmingly necessary to
advance these interests as to satisfy the ... standard. ' 80 Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that imposing liability in this case was "too precipitous a
means of advancing these interests, 81 and thus did not meet the "narrowly
tailored" standard.
In its only previous private-facts privacy case, 2 the Court used a very
different method of analysis-a variant of the categorical model-to hold
that information obtained from an open judicial record was absolutely
protected from tort liability. In both the previous case and in Florida Star
the Court was invited to adopt a much broader categorical rule-that all
truthful speech is absolutely protected from liability for invasion of privacy.
In neither case did the Court rule out that possibility; it merely elected to
decide the case on narrower grounds. FloridaStar suggests, however, that
the Court is not likely to adopt the broader ground:
We continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the
interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more
broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case. 3
The Court insisted it was leaving open the possibility that publication
of a rape victim's name might be actionable under some circumstance, but
if Florida Star was not such a case, it is difficult to imagine a case that
would be actionable. And since publication of a rape victim's name seems
to present the privacy interest in one of its stronger forms, the Florida Star
decision seems to leave little vitality in the tort of disclosure of private
facts.
3. Evaluating the Balancing Model
A balancing analysis of the sort prescribed in Florida Star may be the
Court's most likely response to future claims of constitutional protection
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 2606.
Id. at 2611.
Id. The Court's reasoning is analyzed at infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
FloridaStar, 109 S. Ct. at 2609.
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for tortious speech. For the past 20 years, the balancing method has been
the Court's solution of choice for new types of first amendment issues. It
is the closest thing to a universal solvent for first amendment problems that
the Court has found since the clear and present danger test. The inquiries
it prescribes-into importance of state interests and appropriateness of the
remedy-are now familiar to lawyers and judges, not only from other first
amendment contexts, but also from equal protection law. 4 Perhaps most
important, the balancing method would provide a single analytical model
for all the tortious speech problems the Court has not yet addressed. It
would, however, be a singularly inappropriate solution for tortious speech
cases.

a. Unpredictability
For one thing, the balancing model does not produce generally applicable
principles. Florida Star did not even produce a resolution for other privacy
cases in which the private fact disclosed is a rape victim's name; the Court
specifically observed that tort liability for publishing the name might be
constitutional on other facts.85 To appreciate how little predictive value such
a method has, one need only try to guess what "other facts" would suffice.
In defamation the Supreme Court rejected the balancing model for precisely
this reason:
[T]his approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower
courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing
interests at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we must
lay down broad rules of general application. 86
These concerns are no less pertinent in other torts contexts, including
privacy.
b.

Abstraction

But its ad hoc and thus unpredictable nature is not the only objection
to the balancing model. Tort law itself is more than a little ad hoc, and if
the unpredictability of the balancing method does not preclude its use to
determine whether a speaker may be punished criminally, 7 unpredictability
perhaps need not preclude use of the balancing model to determine whether
tort liability is constitutional. Rather, the objection to balancing in tortspeech conflicts is more fundamental: the balancing model was designed for
scrutiny of governmental regulation and cannot be applied intelligibly to

84. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
85. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
86. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974).
87. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
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common-law tort liability. As Florida Star illustrates, the outcome of a tort
case under the balancing model turns not on the merits of the case, but on
an evaluation of an elusive abstraction-the state's "regulation" of tort
liability.
Tort liability was constitutionally impermissible in Florida Star for
"three independent reasons," each of which persuaded the Court that
liability in the case was not narrowly tailored to protect the interests of
rape victims. s8 First, the state had available a more limited means of
protecting those interests; it could prevent the police from releasing the
name to the press. The statute forbade such release, but that was not
enough, because that effort to protect the victim's interests had failed. 9
The victim could not recover for the wrong done her by the newspaper
because she was also wronged by the police. Once the police placed the
information in the public domain, albeit illegally, B.J.F.'s "hopes for
restitution must rest upon the willingness of the government to compensate
victims for their loss of privacy, and to protect them from the other
consequences of its mishandling of the information which these victims
provided in confidence.'"'9

The second reason B.J.F. lost was that the state had allowed her to
recover on a theory of negligence per se, based on the newspaper's violation
of the statute prohibiting disclosure of rape victims' names. This circumvented two requirements B.J.F. would have had to meet if she had sued
for invasion of privacy at common law: (1) that the disclosure was of a
sort that a reasonable person would find highly offensive, and (2) that her
identity was not a matter of legitimate public interest. 91 The Court also
objected that the negligence per se theory required no showing of fault in
the form of scienter (meaning, presumably, awareness that the disclosure
would invade B.J.F.'s privacy).2 Because the theory of recovery might have
included these requirements but did not, it was not narrowly tailored. These
requirements, however, almost certainly would have made no difference in
B.J.F.'s case. Disclosure of a rape victim's name and the neighborhood in
which she lives, at a time when the assailant is still at large, surely could
be found to be highly offensive. The defendant could hardly contend that
the plaintiff's identity was a matter of legitimate concern, or that the
defendant was unaware that publication would invade B.J.F.'s privacy,
because the Star's policy (violated inadvertently in this instance) was not to
publish such information. And B.J.F. did show fault; the award of punitive

88. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2611-13.
89. Id. at 2611-12. The sheriff's department placed an incident report containing B.J.F.'s
name in the press room, where there were signs indicating that publication of rape victims'
names was prohibited. B.J.F.'s suit included the sheriff's department, which settled for S2,500.
Id. at 2606, 2616.
90. Id. at 2611-12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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damages was based on a finding that the newspaper published with "reckless
indifference" toward her rights. 9

Third, B.J.F.'s recovery was barred because the state gave her a remedy
only against dissemination of her name by the mass media, and not against
dissemination by individuals. This underinclusiveness led the Court to doubt
the bona fides of the state interests ascribed to the statute by B.J.F.9
Because the state did not give B.J.F. a remedy against all possible sources
of invasion of her privacy, it could not give her a remedy against the most
obvious one.
None of the Court's reasons for holding that the constitution barred
recovery in B.J.F.'s case had much to do with the merits of her case. The
balancing model did not scrutinize the particular case, but the state's scheme
of regulation. It is the scheme (or as Justice White called it, the "liability
regime") 9 that must be narrowly tailored to serve interests of the highest
order, not the plaintiff's claim. For this reason B.J.F. had to defend not
only the state's decision to give her a remedy against the newspaper, but
also the possibility that the state had decided not to give her a remedy
against others.
The balancing model employed in FloridaStar v. B.J.F. not only fails
to provide general principles for use in similar cases, but it fails to provide
a just solution for the case at hand as well. The latter interest would be
better served by true ad hoc balancing-balancing the interests in compensating the injury in the particular case against the impact of that particular
recovery on speech. The same question would be asked-is the remedy
narrowly tailored to advance a state interest of the highest order-but it
would be answered by evaluating the facts of the case at hand rather than
the state's scheme of liability.
This model would produce a very different analysis of B.J.F.'s case.
The interests advanced by allowing recovery are strong: the name was
published while the assailant was still at large; the victim's name was not
already widely known; and the defendant did not even argue that the public
had any special interest in knowing the plaintiff's name. Imposing liability
would have no "chilling effect" on the defendant because the newspaper's
policy was not to publish such information anyway; liability would only
induce the defendant to enforce its policy more strictly. The press generally
and the reporter in this case were under no illusion that they could safely
publish such information, because the criminal statute forbade it.,,
This kind of balancing probably would produce a different result in
Florida Star, one that seems more appropriate on the facts. That is the
strength of ad hoc balancing. But if this method were adopted, there would
be little left of tort rules, and little means of predicting what behavior
ultimately might be held constitutionally actionable.
93. Id. at 2606.
94. Id. at 2613.

95. Id.at 2617 (Vhite, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2616 (White, J., dissenting).
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Evaluating a "regime of liability"

Scrutinizing the state's "liability regime" is a far more complex matter
than scrutinizing a criminal statute or agency regulation. Statutes and
regulations are codified, and though subject to change, are at any given
moment fixed and ascertainable. Any particular scheme or regime of tort
liability, however, is a shifting inchoate thing, the mechanics and scope of
which must be discovered in the holdings, language, and implications of
cases. Its boundaries are often fuzzy; the law of any given state is often
incomplete, both because there are issues the courts of that state have not
yet resolved, and because tort law by its nature is incomplete, waiting to
expand or contract as conditions and the perceptions of judges change. This
phenomenon is especially true in the communications torts, a number of
which are relatively undeveloped.
The scrutiny is also complicated by the fact that the state is not present
to explain its regime. This absence is particularly troublesome in evaluating
whether the state's interests are "of the highest order." When balancing is
employed to test a regulation, the state or one of its agencies is present as
a party to explain what the promulgator of the regulation had in mind. In
the tort action, the articulation of the state's interests must be left to the
omniscience of the plaintiff. In Florida Star the Court says:
When a State attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing
truthful publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its
commitment to advancing this interest by applying its prohibition
evenhandedly, to the smalltime disseminator as well as the media
97
giant.
But of course it is not the state that must demonstrate its commitment; it
is the plaintiff who must ascertain what the state's commitment is and
demonstrate that the state has chosen the appropriate means of vindication.
Attorneys general no doubt are often imperfect expositors of the goals
of regulators or legislators, but private litigants are at a much greater
disadvantage. The attorney general may consult the legislators or the agency
that promulgated the regulation. The private litigant has no access to the
judges who promulgated the regime of tort liability except through their
opinions. Since those opinions usually deal with only the questions presented
by litigation, the goals of tort law are often unstated or embodied more in
received wisdom than in judicial opinions.
These differences between evaluating a regulation and evaluating a
"regime of liability" may not have been fully apparent to the Court in
Florida Star, because in that case the cause of action was based on a statute
enabling the Court to analyze the case as if the "regulation" being scrutinized were the criminal penalty prescribed by the statute, not B.J.F.'s tort
action. The Court repeatedly refers to the issue as whether the state may

97. Id. at 2613.
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"punish publication." 9 1 Because of the statute, the Court did not encounter
some of the uncertainties that would normally arise in determining what
circumstances would create liability.
Yet even in this relatively easy setting, ascertaining the scope of the
state's remedy presented enough difficulty to give a hint of the trouble that
lies ahead if the Court persists in applying the balancing model to tortious
speech. As we have seen, one of the determinative inquiries in Florida Star
was whether the remedy was underinclusive. The Court decided it was
because the statute applied only to mass media. But as Justice White pointed
out in dissent, Florida's remedies for invasion of privacy include the common
law as well as the statute. The scheme that should be reviewed, therefore,
is not merely the statute, "but rather the whole of Florida privacy tort
law." 99 Justice White concluded that it was possible that Florida common
law would provide a comparable remedy for nonmedia disclosures, and if
so, the liability regime could not be attacked on the underinclusiveness
ground relied upon by the majority. The majority did not even acknowledge
this possibility. Justice Scalia, concurring on the underinclusiveness ground,
said it was not clear "that Florida's general privacy law would prohibit
such gossip."100
This exchange illustrates two aspects of the difficulty of applying the
balancing model to tort actions. One aspect is the difficulty of ascertaining
what the state's liability regime is. Nothing in the common law of privacy
distinguishes between media publicity and nonmedia disclosures; if it did it
almost certainly would be unconstitutional for discriminating against the
press.°'0 Perhaps the only reason the Florida courts have not considered the
possibility that the common law of privacy covers nonmedia as well as
media disclosures is that lawyers have considered the proposition so likely
that it was not worth questioning. Yet the possibility was treated by the
majority as nonexistent and by Justice Scalia as not sufficiently clear.
The second aspect of the difficulty is that any uncertainty about the
state law tends to be resolved against its constitutionality. This principle is
implied in the majority's position and is explicit in Justice Scalia's. It is
consistent with other applications of the balancing model, which also place
the burden of justification on the party defending the state law. 102 The
balancing model thereby presumes the unconstitutionality of any particular

98. See id. at 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2613. The $100,000 judgment included $25,000 in
punitive damages, but the Court's analysis does not distinguish this from the remainder of the
award, which was compensatory.
99. Id. at 2617.
100. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
101. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983).
102. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 109 S. Ct.
3028 (1989). In Fox the Court stated ".... since the State bears the burden of justifying its
restrictions, [citation omitted], it must affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require."
Id. at 3035.
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communications tort recovery against which a plausible first amendment
argument is made. The tort victim must establish the strength of the state's
interest in providing the recovery in question and that the remedy is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest; if the state of the law is unclear, the
constitution will bar recovery.
d.

Intrusiveness

The balancing model is a more intrusive means of accommodating
speech interests in the communications torts than even the defamation
model. The latter at least prescribes what the constitution requires, and
those are rules of general application that can be relied upon in deciding
pretrial motions and incorporated into jury instructions. The balancing
model, however, contains no prescription of rules beyond the sweeping
generalities of the balancing formula itself. A plaintiff trying to determine
his or her potential obstacles, or a trial judge trying to decide a motion for
summary judgment, will find little guidance in that formula. The balancing
model requires reviewing courts not merely to determine whether a particular
result is consistent with a defined constitutional standard, but to evaluate
the state's total response to the speech and tort interests implicated in the
type of tort action under review. A reviewing Court must evaluate not only
the rules the state has applied, but also the strength of the interests served,
and the availability and efficacy of other means of serving them. This
process requires the reviewing court to second-guess many choices of the
sort that normally are thought appropriate for common-law courts. The
FloridaStar case again illustrates some of these choices.
First, the common law of privacy protects not only secrets known to
the plaintiff alone, but also matters that are known to the plaintiff's friends
but not the public at large.'0 3 The law thus assumes that spreading such
information before the public causes a harm that is not present when the
information is made available to only a few. Florida Star, on the other
hand, refuses to accept the proposition that the public disclosure of a private
fact in a newspaper is a harm that the law might treat differently from
backyard gossip. 104 Justice Scalia answered the common law's assumption
with his own empirical assumption, which many might question:
In the present case, I would anticipate that the rape victim's
discomfort at the dissemination of news of her misfortune among
friends and acquaintances would be at least as great as her discomfort at its publication by the media to people to whom she is only
a name. 105

103. Most matters, even of the most private nature, are known to some persons other
than the plaintiff-family members, medical personnel, business associates, etc. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comment b, mentions as "normally entirely private matters"
sexual relations, illnesses, personal letters, details of home life, and details of past history that
plaintiff would rather forget-all matters that are certain to be known by some other persons.
104. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2612-13.
105. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Second, the private-facts branch of privacy law contains no requirement
of scienter or other species of fault on the part of the defendant. The
apparent reason is that invasions of privacy are very unlikely to be inadvertent. The risk that a disclosure will be privacy-invading is usually apparent
from the very nature of the information. The need to provide breathing
space for honest error as to truth or falsity, which is the rationale for
requiring fault in the constitutional law of defamation, is therefore much
diminished in privacy. The majority in Florida Star, however, considered it
"perverse" to require fault in defamation but not in privacy.106
Third, through the doctrine of negligence per se, courts give legislatures
a role in deciding what conduct should give rise to liability. Through this
doctrine, courts defer to the legislative prohibition of certain conduct as
also determinative of what conduct should be considered reasonable in tort
law. In Floirda Star, by treating violation of the statute as negligence per
se, the Florida courts ascribe to the legislature a judgment that publication
of a rape victim's name is (at least presumptively) highly offensive and not
a matter of legitimate public concern. 0 7 The majority says the courts cannot
defer to the legislature in this respect, because individualized adjudication
is "indispensable" when constitutional interests are at stake. 08
Finally, tort law often chooses to make available only incomplete
remedies. Caps on damages for pain and suffering, limitations on the classes
of survivors who can recover for wrongful death, and denial of damages
for economic loss are familiar examples. Courts make these compromises
for many reasons: sometimes for administrative convenience, sometimes for
fear of abuses, and sometimes to protect particular classes of defendants.
But in Florida Star the Court said a rule affording only an incomplete
remedy for invasion of privacy (reading Florida law as allowing the action
only against media dissemination) "simply cannot be defended on the ground
that partial prohibitions may effect partial relief."'' 9
Second-guessing tort law choices, of course, is precisely what constitutional rules are designed to require. The entire constitutional law of defamation is a product of second-guessing the judgments tort law had made
about the need to protect speech interests from the effects of libel judgments.
But in that context the second-guessing is less intrusive because the reviewing
court makes a one-time evaluation of those effects and then prescribes
general rules that it believes will better accommodate the competing interests.
In the balancing model, the second-guessing occurs anew with each case.
III.

TORT LAW

These models of constitutional analysis enable courts to take into
account a great number of variables in assessing the speech interest at stake

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 2612.
Id. at 2617 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.at 2612.
Id.at 2613.
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in any communications tort setting. They permit distinctions between speech
on matters of public significance and speech of purely private concern.
Speech that is politically motivated can be treated differently from economically motivated speech. Truthful speech is distinguished from falsehood,
and within the latter, knowing or reckless falsehoods may be distinguished
from those that are merely negligent or even innocent. Truthful speech can
be further parsed by determining whether it was lawfully acquired. Commercial speech is distinguished from "more important" speech. Commercial
speech doctrine exempts "misleading" speech, suggesting a refinement of
the true-false dichotomy that has yet to be developed. Fraudulent speech
may be exempted from protection, along with incitement.
The recognition of all these variables, gives courts great flexibility in
dealing with the speech side of speech-tort conflicts. What is lacking is any
recognition that the variables are at least as numerous on the tort side. It
is important, of course, to recognize the many speech interests that may be
affected by tort liability, and to appreciate the variety of constitutional
analyses that can be consulted. But these analyses will not produce sensitive
and efficient resolutions of speech-tort conflicts unless we also appreciate
the diversity of the pertinent torts.
A.

Interests Protected

The labels of the various torts only begin to suggest the variety of
interests they protect. Defamation protects not only reputation, but also
public image, personal dignity, and emotional security. Privacy protects
similar dignity and emotional interests, but also one's personal secrets, one's
security from unwanted intrusions, and one's power to control the commercial exploitation of one's persona. Actions for infliction of emotional
distress protect against mental anguish, but also against the physical illness
and social and economic dysfunction that can flow from severe emotional
distress. Misrepresentation, injurious falsehood, and interference with business relations protect trade relations, economic expectancies, goodwill, the
value of corporate and product image, and commercial secrets.
In addition to those interests of the particular plaintiff, the communications torts protect a range of broader social interests. The defamation,
privacy, and emotional distress torts help preserve a modicum of humanity,
civility, and integrity in public discourse.110 The law of misrepresentation,
injurious falsehood, and interference with patronage protects the integrity
of the marketplace, and interference with contract helps protect the bargaining process.

110. See Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691 (1986). This superb article reveals the interests served by the
law of defamation to be more powerful, more subtle, and more varied than most of us had
previously appreciated. If the perceptiveness of this article were brought to bear on the interests
served by other communications torts, I suspect some of those also would turn out to be more
compelling than is commonly supposed.
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The interests protected vary in importance as well as in kind. Consider,
for example, the two most important privacy torts. The first, commercial
exploitation, is primarily an economic construct. By creating a tort for use
of a person's image to promote a business, a product, a service, or even a
charity, the law has created an entire industry that generates millions of
dollars of income for entertainers, sports heroes, retired politicians, and
other celebrities, to say nothing of the agents, photographers, producers,
and lawyers who are employed in the endorsement industry. The law in this
area is generous with its protection. Plaintiffs are able to prevent not only
unauthorized use of their own names, photos, and voices, but even the use
of impostors who look or sound like them."' Indeed, most states allow the
to control the commercial use of the image
celebrity's heirs to continue
112
after the celebrity's death.
The other major privacy tort, disclosure of private facts, has little
economic value. In a society that is deeply committed to openness, the tort
is hedged about with restrictions that lead some to question whether it
protects anything at all. Plaintiffs rarely win during their lifetimes, and
once they die their secrets may be mercilessly exposed with impunity.113 No
lawyers make a living from this branch of privacy law.
But which of these torts protects the more important interests? Abolishing the law of commercial exploitation would substantially reduce the
income of a few thousand individuals, but would hardly threaten the
Republic. The interests this tort protects are commercially important, but
they are not interests perceived as essential to a civilized society. Protection
of personal privacy, however, is a value many consider as important as any
in our legal system. In a few contexts, such as contraception and abortion,
personal privacy receives specific constitutional protection, and it is a more
general goal of many constitutional rules, such as the prohibition against
unreasonable searches. That personal privacy is a value sometimes protected
by constitutional law does not mean it must be protected by tort law, of
course. But it does suggest that this area of tort law protects an interest
that we value highly. An exploration of the interests served by other
communications torts would reveal similar complexity. But a comparison
of these two related torts is enough to indicate that identifying the interests
protected by a particular tort and evaluating their importance is not the
straightforward matter that the balancing formula implies.
B. Effects on Speech
The impact of these torts on speech interests is as varied as the interests
they protect. Some, like defamation, clash with speech interests strongly
111. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Onassis v.
Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Supp. 1984).
112. The cases are reviewed in Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc.
v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 6521. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
states "Except for the appropriation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of
privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded." Id.
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and frequently. Others, like misrepresentation, rarely present any serious
conflict. Some torts are more likely than others to chill speech. The threat
of defamation lurks in much speech and is often difficult to detect in
advance. The risk of invasion of privacy is less frequent, at least in speech
that lies close to the core of first amendment values, and is usually readily
apparent. The risk of liability for interference with contract is confined to
very specific circumstances, and is not a factor in the vast majority of
speech. These variations are present even in the same general body of tort
law. Negligent misrepresentation, for example, often presents the potential
for unexpected and draconian liability, while the risks flowing from deceit
are usually obvious.
Moreover, fear of self-censorship must somehow be reconciled with the
fact that one of the purposes of tort law is deterrence. An impetus to selfcensorship may be exactly what the law should create. If the tort involves
speech urging the elderly to buy worthless insurance policies, the chilling
effect that the remedy will produce is a plus.
Attempts to assess the effect of tort liability on speech must also take
into account the nature of the speech. In a related area, the Supreme Court
has observed that commercial speech may be less vulnerable to chilling
4
because it is easier to verify and more durable than other types of speech."1
If commercial speech is durable, fraudulent speech sometimes seems to be
indestructible. Even in noncommercial speech, risks of self-censorship may
differ. Plaintiffs rarely win against the media in either private-facts privacy
or defamation cases, yet the media continues to view defamation law as a
significant source of self-censorship, while privacy law seems to have little
chilling effect.
C.

Tort Law Protectionsfor Speech

The communications torts also vary widely in the degree to which their
own rules accommodate speech interests. Most of the common law of
defamation consists of rules designed to protect speech: privileges, restrictions on what may be considered defamatory, special harm requirements,
and defenses such as substantial truth. Much of privacy law was developed
after courts recognized that tortious speech might be constitutionally protected, so its own rules include important speech protections. The business
torts developed largely without constitutional influence, but even they provide some protections for speech. The law of interference with business
relations accommodates speech values by asking whether the interference is
"malicious" or "improper.""11 5 Deceit protects even false speech unless it is

114. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976).
115. "Malice" was the requisite at common law. See Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749
(1853). "Improper" is the substitute proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767,
and that concept is widely employed today. See, e.g., Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin and
Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978).

1990]

TORTIOUS SPEECH

spoken with scienter, i.e., lack of any reasonable basis for believing it is
true. The negligent misrepresenter faces no liability even for false information unless the speaker intends the recipient to rely on it in a business
transaction.
In some instances the courts might decide that these tort law protections
are sufficient. For example, if tort law clearly states that speech interests
must be given heavy weight in determining whether speech interfering with
patronage is actionable, there may be no need for any additional constitutional protection. One of the unfortunate consequences of prescribing constitutional rules is that it stunts the growth of state law. This has happened
in defamation, where constitutional requirements have left the states little
room or incentive to experiment with their own solutions to the speech-tort
conflict.
Today there is little reason to believe that state courts are generally
insensitive to speech interests or unwilling to change outmoded tort rules.
Indeed, some state courts are now more protective of some kinds of speech
than the Supreme Court.", In areas not already preempted by constitutional
rules, courts are fashioning new tort rules that protect speech quite effectively. They have blunted the threat of newspaper liability to readers who
suffer financial losses through reliance on erroneous information by holding
that readers are not within the scope of the newspaper's liability for negligent
misrepresentation.1 7 They have protected publishers from liability for publishing ads that cause physical harm by holding that the publisher has no
duty in negligence law to screen the ads. 1 8
When some states are adequately protecting the speech values in tort
cases and others are not, a solution may be to selectively constitutionalize
the tort rules that are sufficiently protective. This appears to have occurred
(though for other reasons) in private-facts privacy; the common-law rule
denying liability when the disclosure is of a matter of legitimate public
interest now seems to be a constitutional rule." 9 The decisions mentioned
above, restricting publishers' liability for negligently caused economic and
physical harms, are other examples of rules that might be constitutionalized
if states fail to follow them as a matter of tort law. Courts should use this
option sparingly, however, because tort rules when constitutionalized become
as stultifying as any other kind of constitutional rules.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The balancing model is not an appropriate method of analyzing specific
speech-tort conflicts, but it does ask some questions that are pertinent in a

116. See, e.g., Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 2590, 372 S.E.2d 711 (1988) (refusing to recognize

cause of action for private-facts branch of privacy); State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9
(1987) (obscene speech protected by state constitution).
117. See Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986).

118. See Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
119. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
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more general way: what are the interests served by the tort in question, and
what is its impact on speech interests? Before choosing a model of constitutional analysis for a particular case-indeed, before concluding that it is
necessary to supplement the tort analysis with any constitutional modelcourts should ask those questions. The answers might lead a court to
conclude, for example, that the private-facts branch of privacy deserves
considerable deference, while the false-light branch does not. The former is
the only means of protecting a personal dignity interest that is almost
universally recognized, while the latter overlaps to some extent with defamation and private-facts remedies, and seems to protect only interests that
20
those bodies of law have chosen not to protect.
Courts might conclude that the tort of deceit requires less constitutionalization than interference with contract. The former by definition imposes
liability for only falsehood, and it provides a remedy for speech that
experience shows is hard to deter, and is almost always economically and
socially destructive. Interference with contract, on the other hand, is as
likely to be accomplished by truth as by falsehood, and its social and
economic consequences are more questionable. It helps preserve the inviolability of contracts, but it is only supplementary to the usual breach-ofcontract remedies in that respect, and it interferes with the concept of
efficient breach of contracts. It subjects the interferor to punitive damages,
while the breacher (who would seem to be at least equally culpable) is not
subject to such damages-a fact that makes it hard to find that the remedy
is narrowly tailored.
When a court concludes that tort rules are insufficient to protect first
amendment interests, it has essentially two options. The first is simply to
hold the challenged tort law unconstitutional, leaving the state to guess how
or whether the tort can be modified to make it constitutional. The other
option is to prescribe what the constitution requires.
Employing the balancing model to hold a tort recovery unconstitutional
is a manner of exercising the first option; the decision prescribes nothing.
The balancing court may conclude that the interest protected by the tort is
not strong enough to justify any burden on the speech interest, but more
often it will merely indicate that the remedy in question is not a permissible
means of addressing the tort interest. The process may tell the state what
is wrong with its remedy, but it does not prescribe the solution.
The defamation model is the preeminent example of the second option,
prescribing specific constitutional rules to supplement or replace tort principles. In the Supreme Court's defamation cases the states are not only told
why their libel law gives insufficient protection to speech, but they are also
told how their law must be modified to be constitutional: public plaintiffs
must not be allowed to recover unless they can show actual malice; private
plaintiffs must not be allowed to recover unless they can show negligence,

120. See Renwick v. News and Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
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and then only for actual injury; both classes must carry the burden of
proving falsity, and neither can recover for statements of opinion.
The first option is attractive to courts for several reasons. It keeps
courts' constitutional role separate from their common-law role. It leaves
the states some room to experiment with their own solutions to speech-tort
conflicts. Perhaps most important, it enables courts to identify problems
without having to provide solutions. For example, it has allowed the
Supreme Court to recognize the collision between the private-facts branch
of privacy law and first amendment interests, and to resolve those conflicts
on an ad hoc basis in favor of the speech interests, without having to
decide how or whether the underlying conflict can be resolved. This aspect
of the nonprescriptive approach is especially valuable when there is little
consensus among members of the Court; obtaining five votes to hold a
particular recovery unconstitutional is no doubt easier than reaching agreement as to what would be constitutional.
Use of this option in the tort context, however, is profoundly unfair
to private litigants. In the regulatory context, the legislature or an agency
must decide how to respond, if at all, to a decision holding a statute or
regulation unconstitutional. These bodies have the power and the responsibility to decide the state's interests. If they choose to experiment with
solutions that may or may not prove sufficient, they do so at public expense.
If the first solution fails, their institutional continuity enables them to follow
up with alternatives.
When a court provides no solution to a constitutional problem in tort
law, however, these burdens fall on private litigants. The plaintiff whose
case identifies the constitutional problem may get no opportunity to suggest
a solution; even if the decision has little to do with the merits of the case,
as in Florida Star, it usually disposes of the plaintiff's claim. The burden
of proposing a solution to the tort-speech conflict falls to those future
litigants who are willing to gamble on their own (or their lawyers') ability
to predict whether a particular solution will be constitutionally acceptable.
Because not every potential litigant will be able or willing to take that
gamble, some deserving claims will not be brought, and some defendants
will settle improvidently.
This nonprescriptive approach also exacts a price from the public.
Whether the speech-tort conflict is ever revisited-and if it is, the thoroughness with which the competing interests are identified and articulatedis entirely at the mercy of private litigants. The Court in Florida Star
conceded that the state has strong interests in protecting the privacy of rape
victims, and said that those interests might justify imposition of tort liability
in some circumstances. But the matter will get no further consideration
until some future rape victim whose name is published is willing to gamble
that her case will seem more compelling to a court than B.J.F.'s. There is
always the possibility that the legislature will intervene to vindicate the
state's interest, but insofar as tort liability is concerned, legislatures are
accustomed to deferring to the courts.
When a court holds a recovery for tortious speech unconstitutional, it
shirks its responsibility if it fails to say what, if anything, can be changed

104
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to make the rules of the tort constitutionally acceptable. The burden of
prescribing is onerous, and it cannot be discharged by embracing the
defamation model as an all-purpose solution for other types of tort-speech
conflicts to which that model is not suited. But the court is best positioned
to resolve the conflict, and it is unfair to place the burden on future
litigants. Moreover, here as elsewhere the power to proclaim is more likely
to be exercised judiciously if it is accompanied by the responsibility to
resolve.

